Building Peace After Armed Conflict in Bosnia

Building Peace After Armed Conflict in BosniaProvide a critical assessment of world(prenominal) efforts to build intermission after armed conflict in BosniaThe Bosnian War broke out in March 1992, and persisted virulently along ethnic lines until the signature of the General modelling Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina on December 14, 1995. Also known as the Dayton Accords, the peaceableness treaty was arguably the external biotic familiaritys 1 around substantial contribution to ending the armed conflict. Many observers and Bosnians assess the immediate goals of the Dayton Accords as successful Bosnians are no longer at struggle, and NATO forces enforced peace with few casualties. 2 Yet, while the Dayton Accords ended the struggle, the structural framework that it set up perpetuates the confrontation that drove the conflict. Thus, durable peace remains elusive. This paper critically assesses the transnational alliances strategy to build peace in post-armed conf lict Bosnia by analysing three main variables policy, policy-making economy, and aegis and rule-of-law. This paper can do justice in a brief analysis to the complex dynamics and issues of post-war Bosnia. Nonetheless, it demonstrates that the need for cooperative, topical anaesthetic peacebuilding ownership is dire, and Bosnia conducts systemic reform to enable it. Bosnia and the external actors be in possession of made great strides in forming positive peace. To date, however, the international coalition has lacked the political will and foresight to address the conflicts underlying issues, creating a placement quo that is unsustainable in the long term.The Dayton Accords structured Bosnia as one order with two autonomous components the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and the Republika Srpska (RS). 3 The Accords institutionalised dysfunction within the political system, creating a acres with uncertain capacity and legitimacy that relies on international actors an d institutions. 4 Bosnias problems during war consisted of slay, rape, and ethnic cleansing today, Bosnia must deal with lawlessness, corruption, and frugal stagnation. Overcoming the latter issues is critical to social, political, and economic growth. Since the end of armed conflict in December 1995, the international coalition has been attempting to transform mogul in war-torn Bosnia to realize a prosperous future. An telling transformation simultaneously addresses political, political-economic, and security dynamics. 5 The international community move upes these variables disparately and therefore counterproductively, detrimentally affecting social, political, and economic development.Transforming political world power and promoting self-governanceA political transformation entails channelling the contestation for power by non-violent outlets, most simply manifested through free and fair elections and legitimate governance. 6 Competition in Bosnia is now focused non-violen tly through its political system, though this accomplishment is only a half-success. The Dayton Accords implemented a highly fractured political system that has led to a fragmented situate ethnic rivalriesrelatively inactive under Josip Titos Yugoslavian regime, but enflamed through the conflicts following its dissolutionare entrenched in every political decision. 7 Bosnias decentralised power sharing prevents hysteria, but it does not promote peace it instigates political gridlock. spot the decentralisation may have been necessary to frame a successful peace agreement, the systemic dysfunction was not a necessary outcome of the armed conflict. Rather, it is (at least in part) a result of rushed elections after Dayton, propped up by an inefficient electoral system. 8 This is in addition to a failure to support the creation of alternative political and social projects in civil decree, which exists isolated from Bosnias socio-political context. 9The international coalition hoped that the Dayton Accords would lead to a political and social system that would help Bosnians develop a shared Bosnian identity. 10 The Accord had the opposite effect. In order to situate Bosnian-Serb support during peace talks, the negotiators agreed to establish a weak central government that would lack authority over ethnically found entities. Bosnia separated into two autonomous regions with 13 overlapping constitutions, officially dividing Bosnians into three separate ethnic groups. 11 After concluding negotiations, the international community rushed elections with a counter-productive electoral system. Rather than encourage compromise across divisions, the system reinforced ethnocentrism and the power of obstinate, superpatrioticic leaders. 12 Voters consistently cast ballots along ethnic lines, and the cumbersome political system masks corruption and incompetence once the leaders are in office. 13 The nationalists that entered office following the Dayton Accords delayed ins titutional development that may have worked to unify the highly fractured society, out of fear of giving one party too very much power. 14This has become a pattern, with the main nationalist parties from Bosniak, Serb, and Croat factions maintaining control of the countrys three-seat presidency after elections in October 2014. 15 In the current system, no party has incentive to cooperate with another, and its decentralized nature allows one party to paralyze the ofttimes protracted negotiations that precede nearly every decision. 16 Political inaction has compelled the richly Representative, with the power to force legislation and dismiss elected officials, to intervene multiple times. Meanwhile, doing so stymies democratic development toward a self-governing state independent of any international administrator. 17The constitutional structure requires reform, though change proves to be difficult. To its credit, the international community has recognized this. However, diverse pac kages of carrots and sticks to incentivize economic and political progressincluding prospective European Union membership and sanctions, respectively proved ineffective. Even using these potent weapons, it has not been practicable to force amendments to the constitution, says Matthew Parish, a former legal advisor to the international supervisor of Bosnias Brcko Districtks. 18 Nonetheless, the European Union and NATO continue to dangle membership prospects in front of the Bosnian government in hopes of encouraging reform. Any reform to improve the political system would likely strengthen the central government, thereby weakening the RS. This is the impasse amidst BiH and the RS. The RS frequently threatens secession in response to centralisation efforts. 19 There is no guarantee that movement toward EU or NATO membership would end the zero-sum relationship amongst the RS and BiH. Instead, a strong civil society may be a viable method to resolve tensions between the two entities.T he OSCE 20has defined civil society in Bosnia as the sum of national wills that act independently of the state without obstructing the state in carrying out its responsibilities. 21It is a space where civilian collectivization, through a diverse set of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), counterbalances the states power and prevents it from dominating society. 22 Ideally, a strong and functioning civil society would generate tolerance, modernisation and social participation, emphasising local participation in peacebuilding. 23 Given this potential, the international community has exerted significant effort to cultivate a strong civil society. Despite its attempts, however, the international communitys extensive influence in the country undermines its efforts. outside(a) efforts to bolster civil society growth are more often associated with the quantity of NGOs rather than their quality, and Bosnian citizens see civil society building programs as discounting local history and soc ial dynamics. 24 Further undercutting its significance, political officials are arguably more accountable to the international community than to their voters. The High Representative ultimately determines the course of Bosnias politics. Thus, the expectation that local organizations will hold political leaders accountable is a organic illusion, and civil society will remain weak and insecure. 25 Bosnian politicsopaque, unaccountable, and corruptare consequentially unaccountable to civilians. 26 The constitutional structure, while preventing violence, maintains ethnic tensions and causes citizens to pragmatically adhere to ethnic politics in response to their perceived insecurity and lack of political participation. 27 A strong civil society is not an counterpoison for Bosnian politics ills, though it is vital for long-term democratic growth. 28 Presently, citizens insecurity and its isolation from the state provide it with little space to promote reconciliation and ease up to peac e.Establishing security and the rule of lawWhile it may not needs be causal, one of the most accurate predictors of whether or not a state will descend into civil war is whether it has already experienced one. 29 A vital factor to prevent resurgent conflict is to establish a secure environment which precludes militant factions from pursuing goals through violence. 30 It is equally important to secure this environment with an institutional capacity to maintain the rule of law and to exact justice. 31 The international community in Bosnia has prevented conflict relapse, though it has done so by institutionalising the conflict, maintaining tensions. Simply put, the international community has created an environment in which it is costlier to fight a war than it is to compete for power through politics. 32 While resurging war may not be a likely possibility, Bosnia is mired in corruption, organized crime, ethnic tension, and violence that prevents political, social, and economic develo pmentmaintaining a status quo between armed conflict and durable peace. This is partially a result of internationally mandated post-conflict amnesty laws, prolonged war- woeful prosecutions, and a failure to transform the wartime economy into a legitimate formal economy.The international community demanded the establishment of the Federal forgiveness Law to prevent political prosecution of returning refugees, draft dodgers, and soldiers charged with a crime, other than serious violation of international humanitarian law. 33 The international community intended to provide Bosnian citizens security whilst they rebuild their lives following the conflict. A number of Bosnian politicians and elites took advantage of the amnesty laws to include crimes like illegal commerce, tax evasion, and illegal use of humanitarian aid, and they expand the time the amnesty covered to include January 1991. 34 These pardoned offenses may have provided simplicity to a number of soldiers that had commit ted regular wartime acts in line with the terms of the Amnesty Law. However, the expanded time-period also provided cover for corrupt officials crimes more than a year prior to the war. Amnesty laws forced prosecutors to drop pending investigations and indictments for politicians in the main nationalist parties, allowing them to continue to compete for power after the war.International actors sought prosecution for the alleged wrongs that the Amnesty Law did not excuse. Chief among these prosecutions was that of the leaders of the warring factions for committing crimes against humanity, including genocide. As the international community saw was necessary following the Second World War, the Rwandan Genocide, and East Timor, justice is often requisite to attain durable peace. 35 The international community lacked the political will after the Dayton Accords to pursue war criminals for arrest, despite indicting them for their acts. The linked States, for one, NATOs member with the gre atest capacity for force, refused to fortune another Somalia-like war criminal hunt. The international tribunal had to rely on its member states to extradite the alleged criminals. This proved ineffective until the early 2000s the international community was unwilling to take meaning(prenominal) action to hasten or force extradition, and the states where war criminals resided were either unwilling or incapable of pursuing them. 36Nearly twenty years after the wars end, Ratko Mladi, Radovan Karadi, Goran Hadi, and Vojislav eeljfour of the conflicts most notorious war criminalsremain on trial. While 141 proceedings of the 161 indicted criminals have concluded, many critics state that the international tribunal has taken far too long to bring the accused to trial, and that those who have been found guilty have received lenient sentences. 37 This perceived lack of justice prevents closure, and perpetuates the doctrine of collective guilt over individual responsibility for atrocities. As a 2013 UN poll demonstrated, Bosnians must reconcile their past in advance they embrace their future. 38 The international communitys role in this has so far been mixed the atmosphere of impunity is now over, though the results have been demonstrably underwhelming. 39Bosnias unreformed political economyThe World Bank estimates that Bosnias shadow economy composes X percent of its GDP. 40 The formal, legitimate economy remains highly dependent on external support, and founders in comparison to the resistance market. The Dayton Accords catalysed an internationally led privatisation effort that led to rent-seeking and corruption organized crime is woven tightly through the public and private sectors. Consequentially, the current situation in Bosnia is rife with contradicting relationships the shadow economy complicates peacebuilding and international efforts, though international intervention has fuelled organized crime moreover, while the surreptitious economy frustrates reconst ruction, citizens depend on it for survivalthe formal economy cannot support them. 41The international community imposed an arms embargo on Bosnia in September 1991. The Bosnian-Serbs were remedy positioned geographically and financially to circumvent the embargo, and armed themselves through relatively accessible smuggling channels. 42 The Bosnian faction relied on international actors and, despite the United States still refusal to enforce the embargo and Irans assistance, was unable to obtain much more than small arms. At the start of the war, the Bosnian-Serbs possessed far superior artillery and firepower, outgunning the Bosnians night club to one. 43 Partially because of the military imbalance, the Bosnian-Serb forces were able to stage the longest siege in modern history on Sarajevo. Supplemented by the UNs massive humanitarian relief aid effort, the Bosnians survived the siege through its reliance on diverse and ubiquitous smuggling networkswhich the international communi ty supported, often directly. 44 People most connected to the underground economy allowed the war economy, and thus the people, to survive. Throughout each side of the conflict, the newly enriched criminal elite formed ties with political leaders that persisted after the conflict. The international community has largely ignored a key correlation, and has thus failed to create a gainful, legitimate political economy The more criminalised the conflict, the more criminalised the state, economy, and society that emergecriminal capital accumulated during a criminalized war has been converted to political and economic capital after the war. 45International finance institutions, particularly the World Bank and the International fiscal Fund, mandated widespread privatisation. Bosnia, especially immediately after the Dayton Accords, lacked coherent regulatory institutions to manage market bragging(a)isation and fair economic competition (Paris 2004). The international actors approached lib eralisation in front institutionalisation. Despite international oversight, this led war-time criminal elite to co-opt privatisation and deregulation. Corruption and botched privatisation efforts are in part responsible for todays 44.5 percent unemployment rate (60 percent for 15-to-24-year-olds) and a $545/ month average wage. 46 Ostensibly, this partly caused protests in February 2014 across 30 cities throughout BiH and calls for the governments wholesale resignation. 47 Bosnias post-Dayton political system facilitates this corruption through its radical decentralisation and weak regulation, failing to dismantle the criminalized war-time economy.Bosnias future and the international interventionThe international communitys direct intervention, in seeking to end the conflict swiftly, entrenched the confrontation in a top-down, zero-sum political system that lacks local legitimacy. If politicians adhere to international mandates, they risk alienating citizens. Local ownership, in it s current form, would therefore limit external assistance. One possible remedy is to convert Bosnia to a welfare state. The international finance agencies have so far focused on establishing an environment conducive to private business. Privatisation, however, has returned few positive results. Massive, state-driven job creation could give citizens a pursuit in the government and spur economic development that private sector oligarchs are unwilling to approach. However, the state lacks the coherence and self-regulation to work across ethnic groups it would require reform before taking such action, and if history is any indicator, opposing parties are likely to block any changes. Nonetheless, the international communitys neoliberal, one-size-fits-all approach may not be suitable to Bosnian economic development.Bosnia faces a number of structural challenges that limit development. While it has managed to transform the competition for power through political channels, it maintains an insecure atmosphere in which Bosnians cannot hold their state accountable. In order to become more centralisedand therefore more efficientthe RS would necessarily relinquish power to the Bosniak majority. This is zero-sum dynamic that the Bosnian-Serbs find threatening. Reflecting on past tensions, they fear tyranny of the majority. Proponents of NATO and EU membership aver that membership would relieve the Bosnian factions of the fear that prevents constitutional reform. While EU membership would require the reform that it would ultimately allow, NATO membership requires less and is a relatively achievable future. 48 Nonetheless, NATOs security guarantee does not necessarily extend to intrastate conflict. It is highly likely that NATO would intervene much swifter in a resurgent conflict in order to prevent a Srebrenica massacre redux, but that is already the case. Membership would provide measures to prevent the RS from seceding, but only to an extent after all, this did not stop S cotlands 2014 attempt at secession. International peacebuilding has so far provided Bosnians with security from armed conflict, though it has maintained an otherwise politically and economically insecure state. The ethnically divided country requires reformthat much is evident. While the international community is partially responsible for states dysfunctional structure, this does mean it should disengage from the country. On the contrary, the dysfunction has created a situation in which Bosnia is entirely dependent on international actorsdisengagement could prove cataclysmic. Rather, the international community must change its strategy. Until it does, the international community must maintain a dysfunctional state, otherwise doomed to languish under ineffective domestic leadership and international stewardship.1 See Appendix A for a list of international actors2 Hendrickson, Ryan. 2005. History Crossing the Rubicon. NATO Review. NATO. http//www.nato.int/docu/review/2005/issue3/engl ish/history.htmltop.3 Peace Support Operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 2014. NATO. NATO. November 11. http//www.nato.int/cps/fr/natohq/topics_52122.htm?selectedLocale=en.4 Bliesemann de Guevara, Berit States of Conflict A case use up on Peace-Building in Bosnia-Herzegovina5 Hawley, Leanard. 2007. Keynote Presentation Policy and Strategies for International Intervention. The Cornwallis Group XII Analysis for Multi-Agency Support.6 Hawley, Keynote Presentation7 Toal, Gerard, and Carl Dahlman. 2011. Bosnia Remade Ethnic Cleansing and Its Reversal. Oxford University Press.8 Roland, Paris. 2010. Saving liberal peacebuilding. Review of International Studies, 36, pp337-365.9 Belloni, Robert. 2001. Civil Society and Peacebuilding in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Journal of Peace Research 38(2).10 Silber, Laura. 2005. Dayton, 10 Years After. The New York Times, November 5. http//www.nytimes.com/2005/11/21/ faith/21Silber.html?pagewanted=print_r=0.11Silber, Laura, and Allan Little. 1998. Yugos lavia Death of a Nation. United States TV Books Inc.12 Bliesemann de Guevara, Berit. 2009. Institute for Public Policy Research.13 idib14 idib15 Staff. 2014. Divided Nationalists Win Bosnia Elections. Al Jazeera, October 13. http//www.aljazeera.com/news/europe/2014/10/divided-nationalists-win-bosnia-elections-2014101314183747199.html.16 Bennett, Christopher. 2010. Bosnias Paralysed Peace. United Kingdom C Hurst Co Publishers Ltd.http//www.nytimes.com/2005/11/21/opinion/21Silber.html?pagewanted=2_r=2sq=dayton peace accordsst=nytscp=417 Chandler, David. 2007. The High Representative for Bosnia Still Runs It like a Feudal Fiefdom. The Guardian, November 20. http//www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2007/nov/20/russia.eu.18 Salem, Harriet. 2014. Bosnia Burning. 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(2004) avaritia and Grievance in Civil War, Oxford Economic Papers.30 http//web.worldbank.org/archive/website01306/web/pdf/wdr background paper_walter_0.pdf31 Secretary of defence32 source33 See for list of covered offenses UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Amnesty Laws in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 19 March 1998, available at http//www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b33214.html accessed 30 November 201434 The Clandestine Political economy of war and peace in Bosnia35 Judge Richard Holdstone, head prosecutor of International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, has argued the same http//www.ecfr.eu/ijp/case/israel_palestinefn136 Source37 http//www.icty.org/sections/TheCases/KeyFiguresoftheCases38 UN poll39 Twenty Years of International Criminal Law From the ICTY to the ICC and beyond Theodor Meron and Fatou Bensouda Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law), Vol. 107, (April 2013) , pp. 407-42040 World Bank4142 Cigar 199543 Source44 Source45 Source4647 Source48 Sou